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INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN AN 1EXPORT1 ECONOMY: 
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE BEFORE 1914 
I - INTRODUCTION 1 
Under what conditions does an economy specialised in 
primary product exports become industrialised? More specifi-
cally, what induces capital to move into activities geared to 
the internal market, rather than the traditional export sector, 
and where does this capital come from? The Brazilian 
experience since the late nineteenth century is clearly relevant 
in connection with those questions: it represents - distortions 
and inequalities apart - an accomplished transformation of a 
typical export-based economy into one with a relatively high 
level of diversification. This paper brings some new evidence 
on the first steps of that process, in the period before the 
First World War. This evidence, it will be argued, brings into 
question some accepted notions on the early development of 
manufacturing production in Brazil, especially as concerns the 
role of tariff protection, and the relations between the new 
sector and the old export-oriented activities. 
Two opposite views can be broadly recognised, in the 
literature, as to the relations between exports and industrial 
investment in Brazil.2 In the initial interpretations of 
Brazilian industrialisation, much emphasis was given to the 
stimulus provided by demand shifts towards home-produced goods, 
in times of crisis -in the external trade, as the basic factor of 
industrial growth - notably in the influential book by C. Furtado 
(1959i chs. 21, 22). Industrialisation was associated, thus, 
with unfavourable circumstances in the external sector (the so-
called 'adverse shocks' argument). Although the conditions 
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surrounding the decision to invest were not much explored in this 
context, the general view was that the development of internal 
productive capacity had largely been induced by the external 
trade 'shocks1 themselves. That is, the rise in the internal 
price of importables, induced by the demand shifts (as during 
the Depression of the thirties, or the First World War), 
together with the enlarged profits of pre-existing domestic 
producers of those goods, would have been the basic inducement 
to invest in the manufacturing sector. To the extent that 
export activities were made relatively less profitable by these 
crises (certainly the case in the 1930s), it could also be 
assumed that funds originating from the agro-export business 
would have flowed to manufacturing; the same mechanism thus 
could also help to explain the financing of industrial invest-
ment [Furtado (1959, ch. 22); Baer (1965, ch. 2)]. 
This idea of a link between shock-induced demand upsurges 
and investment in manufactures was weakened, however, by later 
evidence on the actual evolution of investment [v. Villela and 
Suzigan (1973, chs. 4-6)]. In particular, a remarkable lack of 
correspondence is found between periods of growth in internal 
productive capacity and periods of rapid advance in industrial 
production; prima facie, a point difficult to conciliate with 
the adverse shocks argument. This is illustrated in Table 1, 
which shows that imports of industrial equipment before 1945 
were concentrated in the mid-twenties and in the years before 
World War I, both periods of relatively sluggish output growth. 
Table 1: Industrial growth and imports of industrial 
equipment in Brazil, 1900-1945 
Annual growth rate of Index of equipment 
industrial output (%) imports (1939=100) a 
a. Average of the periods, excluding the last year. 
Sources:- Industrial output series from Haddad (1977, 
pp. 147~48); index of industrial equipment imports 
from Villela and Suzigan (1973, p. 437). 
1 9 0 0 - 0 9 5 . 6 61 
1 9 0 9 - 1 4 3 . 0 147 
1914-23 9.0 64 
1 9 2 3 - 3 2 1 . 0 1 3 4 
1 9 3 2 - 3 9 1 0 . 0 95 
1 9 3 9 - 4 5 5 . 7 1 0 9 
The direct flow of capital from agriculture into industry, at 
least in the 1930s, was also found difficult to substantiate 
[v. Silber (1977)]. Under different forms, the view emerged, 
then, that the first industrial investment undertakings could be 
associated, not with crises in the external trade, but, on the 
contrary, with periods of boom in exports [Villela and Suzigan 
(1973); Baer and Villela (1973); Leff (1969); Mello (1975)]. 
As to industrialisation before World War I, two periods are 
generally emphasised (both coinciding with booming export 
activity): the 1890s, and the six to eight years preceding 
the war. A widely accepted view holds that significant 
industrialisation only started in the nineties, aided by the 
credit expansion of the period. Deliberate government policies, 
it is argued, played no direct part in the process; the 
protective effect of tariffs, in particular, is seen as unim-
portant [Fishlow (1972); Villela and Suzigan (1973)]. 
The evidence examined below points, in contrast, to the 
following conclusions, for the pre-1914 period: 
(a) No simple relation between agricultural exports and 
industrial investment can readily be established. The 
behaviour of the export sector was neither 'favourable1 nor 
'unfavourable' to industrialisation; it was both - in different 
periods, and in different senses. 
(b) The development of domestic manufacturing production 
depended crucially on tariff protection. This suggests that an 
adequate understanding of the emergence of industry in nineteenth-
century Brazil requires a study of the conditions under which a 
high tariff barrier for manufactured imports was erected. 
(c) While the 1890s witnessed a rapid growth of manufacturing 
production, evidence on the importance of pre-1890 enterprises 
(and on the role of profit-reinvestment as a source of finance 
for those enterprises) shows that this decade should not be 
taken as the starting point for the study of capital accumulation 
in industry. 
The paper deals with the evolution of investment in the 
cotton textile industry before 1914. This sector was, then, 
the dominant form of manufacturing activity in the country. 
Another advantage of focussing on the cotton industry is derived 
from the fact that Brazil had some weight as an importer of 
cotton goods in the world market: the development of domestic 
production tended to be followed with keen interest by some 
foreign observers, including British diplomatic representatives, 
so that information from those sources partly compensates for the 
dearth of statistical data. 
The next section (II) gives a general picture of the 
evolution of cotton manufacture in Brazil before World War I. 
It is followed by an examination of the role of merchants in the 
development of the industry (III), and of the possible 
importance of exchange rate instability as a source of 
inducement to industrial investment (IV); these points are 
illustrated, next, by a review of the main traits of the four 
pre-1914 investment 'spurts' (V). The question of the origins 
of industrial capital is then briefly examined (VI); this is 
followed by a discussion of the protective effect of the tariff 
system (VII). A final section presents the main conclusions. 
II - THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF COTTON MANUFACTURE: AN OVERVIEW 
The first over-all picture of the Brazilian manufacturing 
sector was provided by the Industrial Survey prepared by the 
Centro Industrial do Brasil, in 1907. In that Survey, the 
capital applied to cotton mills was found to be 35% of the total 
capital in industrial activities; the sector had also 30% of the 
industrial labour force. These numbers underestimate, however, 
the relative importance of cotton manufacture in the period, 
insofar as a large proportion of .what was defined as 'industry1 
in the Survey consisted of small-scale establishments, with a 
very limited degree of mechanisation, or of artisan shops. 
This is seen by the fact that, while in cotton mills the average 
number of workers per establishment was 285, in all other sectors 
this average was only 34; in capital per establishment, the 
value for cotton mills was more than ten times larger than that 
for the remaining activities. In the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(Distrito Federal), where the largest concentration of industrial 
establishments was found - about one fifth of the total - cotton 
mills had 527;; of the labour force of those manufacturing 
establishments with 200 or more operatives [CIB ( 1 9 0 9 , Mappas, 
pp. 16-37, 150)]. There is no doubt that what is said of the 
cotton textile industry, in the period, will be largely true of 
manufacturing as a whole. 
In 1907, internal production of cotton textiles surpassed 
300 million meters, and was twice as large, in value, as total 
imports under the same heading. Two decades before, in 1885, 
production had been estimated at no more than 38 million meters, 
at a time when imports from England alone were about five times 
as large [CIB (1909, p.26l; Mappas, p.144); BCR (1886, p.l88); 
AST]. Clearly, the period 1885-1907 witnessed a very rapid 
growth of production, concurrent with a marked decrease in the 
relative participation of imported goods in internal consumption; 
a typical instance of growth by import substitution, as Fishlow 
(1972) noted. From 1907 to 1913, the industry continued to 
grow, if at a slower pace, while the level of imports did not 
change much; in 1912, the best year before the War, production 
reached 400 million meters [Stein (1957, p.193); IBGE (1939/40, 
p.1329)]. 
The rapid growth from 1885 to 1907 seems particularly 
noteworthy: the numbers quoted above imply an average growth 
rate close to 10% a year. It. is generally accepted that the 
rapid devaluation of the mil-reis in the 1890s was a major 
factor in the boom, diverting demand towards domestically pro-
duced goods (more on this below). On the other hand, it has 
been suggested that a previous expansion in internal productive 
capacity, enabling local producers to respond to the increased 
demand, may have been induced by the sharp credit expansion that 
followed the banking reforms of 1888-89. Both the supply and 
demand shifts could, thus, be attributed to the same cause: 
easy money would have provided funds and stimulus for investment; 
and the ensuing exchange devaluation would have provided 
protection [Fishlow (1972)]. This interpretation gave support 
to the view, adopted in various recent studies, that the first 
important flow of capital into industry occurred in the early 
1890s [Tavares (1974); Mello (1975); Cano (1975); Silva 
(1976)]. 
A closer examination of the available evidence shows, 
however, that industrial undertakings prior to I89O, in the 
cotton sector, were far more important than is generally recog-
nised. This is indicated, for instance, by the fact that firms 
founded before I889 had 47% of the total book value of machinery 
and equipment in the cotton textile industry, in the 1920 Census.3 
A more detailed picture can be gathered from the dates of 
foundation of the early mills: the numbers in Table 2 show that 
fully one-half of the stock of looms in the country, by 1905, 
belonged to mills established before 1889, and a substantial 
proportion was held by mills founded in the seventies, or at 
earlier dates. This indicates not only that the inducement to 
invest in manufacturing was clearly present before the 1890s, 
but also that the expansion of those early firms was a central 
element in the growth of the sector. This point will be 
explored below. 
We know also that domestic producers had already conquered 
some sections of the domestic market from imports by the end.of 
the eighties. In successive reports, the British Consul in Rio 
pointed to the decrease in Brazilian imports of 'domestics1 -
a coarse type of cloth, formerly the main single item in textile 
imports - -due to competition from local production [BCR (1886); 
BCR (1887-A); BCR (1888)]. The numbers in Table 3 suggest an 
impressive advance of import substitution, in this class of 
goods: in seven years imports of 'domestics1 fell by more than 
40%, while total cotton textile imports increased by 22%. In 
1888, another British diplomatic report remarked that 'the 
unbleached cotton [import] trade has been killed by local 
factories' [BCR (1889, p.20)]. This can be contrasted with the 
idea that '[the] first appearance [of import substitution in 
Brazil] was in the 1890s as a direct consequence of inflationary 
finances' [Fishlow (1972, p.311)]. 
Table 2: Brazil: cotton mills in existence in 1905, 
by date of foundation. 
Date of Number of Percentage of 
foundation mills looms in 1905 
Before 1888 50 50*7 
Before 1870 10 4.7 
1870-75 14 16.3 
1876-79 2 5.1 
1880-84 11 15.2 
Before 1884, year 
not ascertained 4 1.5 
1885-88 9 7.8 
After 1888 26 52.5 
1889-95 22 30.2 
1896-1905 ^ 2.3 
Date not ascertained 35 16.8 
TOTAL 111 1 0 0 . 0 * 
Sources: Data on 1905 mills from Cunha Vasco (1905). 
For dates of foundation, see Appendix A. 
* Percentages do not total 100 because of rounding off. 
The data in Table 2 suggest the existence of three periods 
of concentrated investment activity before 1905: 1870-75? 
1880-84, and 1889-95- A fourth period could be added, covering 
the years preceding World War I (1907-1913), when numerous mills 
were founded, especially in Sao Paulo state.4 Evidence on 
machinery imports from the United Kingdom, presented in Table 4, 
points also in the same direction: import values show marked 
increments in those four periods. Before trying to determine 
the distinctive characteristics of these periods, let us see 
what can be said about the agents of these industrial under-
takings . 
Table 3: Cottan textile imports into Rio de Janeiro, 
1878-1886 * 
(1,000 kilos., annual averages) 
a. Comprehensive data on Brazilian external trade was 
not collected before 1900. Rio imports accounted 
for roughly half the total. 
Sources: BCR (1886, p.l87); BCR ( 1 8 8 7 - A , p.2); 
BCR (1888, p.2). 
Table 4: Brazilian imports of machinery from the United 
Kingdom, 1860-1913 
(1896-1906 = 100; period 
averages) 
Textile 
Machinery a machinery 
1 8 6 0 - 1 8 7 0 17 
1 8 7 0 - 1 8 7 5 46 
1 8 7 6 - 1 8 7 9 3 4 
1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 4 75 
1 8 8 5 - 1 8 8 8 75 
1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 5 1 4 8 
1 8 9 6 - 1 9 0 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 9 0 7 - 1 9 1 3 307 
a. 'Machinery and mill work, and parts thereof, not being 
steam engines, agricultural, or sewing machines' . 
Textile machines comprised 56$of this item, in 1893-98. 
b. Separate data on textile machinery appeared for the 
first time in 1893. 
Source; Data on British exports (in sterling) from AST 
(various issues). 
'Domestics' Total 
1 8 7 8 / 7 9 to 1 8 8 0 / 8 1 3 , 3 U 7,59b 
1 8 8 1 / 8 2 to 1 8 8 2 / 8 ^ 2,7kk 7 , 7 6 9 
1 8 8 V 8 5 to 1 8 8 5 / 8 6 2 ,2V7 7 , 6 1 0 
1 8 8 6 / 8 7 1 , 9 6 6 9 , 2 6 / f 
Ill - MERCHANTS AS INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISTS 
Who took the initiative in producing textiles for internal 
consumption? A detailed account of the sources of capital and 
entrepreneurship for the early industrial enterprises will not be 
possible until more information on the history of individual 
firms becomes available. Existing evidence suggests, however, 
that cloth merchants played a central role in the process. 
In the case of the state of Bahia, for instance, where the 
largest concentration of mills existed by 1875 [Stein (1957, 
p.21)] mill founders were mostly merchants [Sampaio (1975, 
pp.52, 58)]. Also, in the Rio de Janeiro area, which succeeded 
Bahia as the main centre of production, cloth merchants are 
mentioned as founders, large stockholders, and directors of some 
of the largest mills. After 1880, in particular, various 
Portuguese cloth importers in Rio decided to invest in textile 
production, as 'many entrepreneurs had been long an ideas and 
short on capital' [Stein (1957, p.71; also pp.31-53; p.230 
nn.23, 26, and 27; p.231 n.29)]. In its development in the 
following decades, the Rio cotton industry followed the same 
pattern: 'mill ownership remained in the hands of a few 
families; Portuguese cloth wholesalers played prominent roles 
in ownership, management, and distribution' [Stein (1957, p.100)]. 
In Minas Gerais, there is evidence of the preponderance of 
commercial capital in the foundation of the important group of 
mills owned by the Mascarenhas family [Mascarenhas (1972, pp.35, 
118)]. 
The mills founded in the state of Sao Paulo by cotton planters 
following tlce fall in world cotton prices in "the 1870s, which 
made that crop unprofitable, were an exception fCanatorava 
(1959, ch.9)]. Most of the these mills passed later, however, 
into the hands of cloth merchants and importers: 
'Of the thirteen cotton mills built before the turn 
of the century in Sao Paulo, eleven, by 1917, were 
controlled by importing firms or by entrepreneurs who 
had started as importers. During the same period 
twenty-one more mills had been constructed, and of 
these sixteen were importer-controlled' 
[Dean ( 1 9 6 9 , pp.26-28)]. 
Take-overs of mills by cloth merchants, after the original 
founders had run into financial difficulties, are reported also 
in the Northeastern states, and seem to have been common in the 
period [Stein (1957, p.230 n.27)]. 
The merchants-entrepreneurs would be, in many cases, local 
shopkeepers or wholesalers who had moved up to the importing 
business. The import trade in textiles evolved from being 
initially dominated by British importers based in Brazil to a 
situation in which local traders had direct relations with 
European manufacturers or merchant houses, expecially after the 
establishment of telegraphic communications between Europe and 
Brazil [BCR (1884); BCR (1899-D); Stein (1957, p.71)3. Cloth 
traders in Rio were mainly Portuguese; after the turn of the 
century, the importance of Italian immigrants in the import 
trade, especially in SSIo Paulo, grew considerably. The 
relative position of immigrants in the cloth trade thus largely 
explains their important participation in the first manufacturing 
ventures.^ 
It can be assumed that cloth merchants would have many 
a priori advantages in turning to the production side of the 
business. Their degree of information on the sector would put 
them in a privileged position to judge the profitability of the 
new activity; their knowledge of commercial channels and access 
to sources of finance such as foreign banks were also obvious 
assets. Those advantages, it has been suggested, have caused 
trading groups to predominate, in the initial phases of manu-
facturing, also in the case of other developing countries [Aubrey 
(1955)]. 
IV - EXCHANGE INSTABILITY AND INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT 
Granted that merchants could have comparative advantages as 
prospective industrialists, it would be left to be explained 
under what conditions they would be driven into manufacturing. 
It will be argued here that two factors were instrumental in 
providing both the carrot and the stick for such moves: exchange 
rate instability and the protective effect of tariffs. First, 
something should be said about demand and labour-supply 
conditions. 
Domestic demand and labour availability 
Although no hard data are available on the internal con-
sumption of cotton textiles in nineteenth-century Brazil, it is 
clear that the size of the market presented no obstacle to the 
development of domestic production, particularly in an industry 
where scale economies are relatively unimportant. This can be 
gathered from the size of Brazilian imports from the United 
Kingdom, the dominant source of supply. In the 1850s, for 
instance, U.K. exports of cotton piece goods to Brazil averaged 
128 million yards per year, a volume sufficient to keep fully 
busy about thirty average mills of the time. In the next three 
decades this trade grew steadily, if at a moderate pace - an 
average rate of about 19% per decade - declining afterwards; in 
the 1880s Brazil absorbed around 5% of the total value of 
British cotton manufacture exports, ranking fourth among the 
largest importers under this heading.° 
As to labour, three main sources of supply were tapped by 
the cotton mills of the period [v. Stein (1957, ch. 7); Clark 
(1910)]. Production managers and foremen, and some skilled 
workers, were commonly hired in England, often under a fixed-
period contract. The poorest sections of the free population 
supplied unskilled workers and trainees; as usually is the case 
in textile manufacturing, these were in large proportion women 
and children. With the increasing flow of immigrants towards 
the end of the century, a third and important pool of prospective 
industrial workers was added. In SSo Paulo, for instance, where 
immigration was mainly concentrated, immigrant labour largely 
predominated in textile mills, after the turn of the century 
[Silva (1976, p.98)]. The impact of immigration was felt not 
only in an expansion of the labour supply, but also in an up-
grading of the average skill level of the labour force. In the 
late 1890s, for example, it was noted that the availability of 
immigrant workers had made possible the establishment of a cloth 
printing mill in Sao Paulo, a line of production which could not, 
at the time, have been adequately manned by native hands [BCR 
(1899-B, p.21f)]. 
Important as the participation of immigrant workers came to 
be, there is no reason to assume that labour availability was an 
insurmountable obstacle to industrial development in the years 
before the onset of large scale immigration (i0e., before the 
mid-eighties). By all accounts, local labour adapted easily to 
industrial employment; and it is well known that the tasks in-
volved in textile manufacturing are simple to learn, especially 
in the coarser types of product, so that skill, although of 
course affecting productivity, is not a limiting factor [Stein 
(1957, p.60ff.); Robson (1957, p.321)]. Given the possibility 
of employing women and children, mill owners could recruit into 
the labour force contingents which before were underutilised; 
this was the case, for instance, of children and adolescents from 
orphanages and foundling homes, a source of cheap labour widely 
utilised in the period [Stein (1957, p.57ff.)]. These workers 
were often lodged in houses or dormitories close to the mills, 
and submitted to strict codes of discipline and behaviour, during 
and outside working hours [Stein (1957); Mascarenhas (1972, 
pp.75ff.); Sampaio (1975, p.89)] . It is significant that in 
I 8 9 I it was found necessary to restrict the employment of children 
in factories by legislation, a minimum age of twelve being 
established; an exception was explicitly made, however, for 
textile mills, where apprentices could be as young as eight 
years old [Decree no. 1313, of 17/1/1891]. It has also been 
pointed out that the decline of old coffee plantations, as in the 
Rio de Janeiro area in the third quarter of the last century, left 
behind labour available for employment in other activities, 
especially women [Castro (1971, p.70)]. Even in rural areas of 
Minas' Gerais, where numerous small mills existed in the early 
eighties [BCR ( I 8 8 7-B)], labour availability was not, apparently, the 
cause of much concern to mill owners.? 
Exchange rate fluctuations 
The recurrent oscillations of the exchange rate, and the 
problems they caused for the import trade, were topics that never 
failed to come up in the writings of contemporary observers of 
the nineteenth-century economic scene in Brazil, In fact, 
exchange fluctuations appeared then as a matter of such 'engross-
ing and universal interest, ....that various conjectures are 
continuously being advanced as to [their] cause1 [BCR (1899-D, 
pp.19-20)]. (However, as put gloomily by the author of an 
early study of the subject, these speculations usually ended in 
'seeking the explanation of the incomprehensible by the aid of 
the supernatural' [Wileman ( I 8 9 6 , p.iii)]). 
Two sorts of exchange rate movement can be distinguished 
in the period. In the short run, quotations were subject to a 
wide margin of fluctuation: from 1 8 6 0 to I 8 9 O , the highest 
quotation of the pound sterling in Rio de Janeiro, over any two-
year period, was on the average 2 a b o v e the lowest quotation of 
the same period.8 This brought a considerable degree of un-
certainty to the import business: importers could never be sure 
at what rate a particular transaction would be settled. Their 
problem was compounded by the customary practice of allowing 
long credit terms - up to one year - in the import trade [BCR 
(1878, pp. 1426-27); BCR (1883, p.1154)]. This trade was in 
good part financed by large European exporting firms, but the 
exchange risk apparently fell on the local importer; at times 
of violent exchange devaluation, bankruptcies among import firms 
were not uncommon. In any case, the margin needed to cover the 
possibility of exchange variations was in itself a protective 
barrier for the local producer [BCR ( I 8 9 9 - D , p.17); BCR (1873, 
p.42); Hutchinson (1910, pp.34-35)]. 
The exchange rate followed also a roughly cyclical path in 
the period, with a precipitous devaluation in the 1890s 
(Figure 1). Two main factors seem to have been operative here. 
In the l860s and 1890s, rapid increases in the stock of money 
could not fail to have an effect on the exchange market.9 
Second, a correspondence between exchange rate and coffee price 
movements is apparent from Figure 1, and has been stressed as 
significant by various authors, notably Furtado [1959, ch.28]. 
Clearly, the chain of causation linking coffee price and exchange 
rate oscillations could go either way; but there are indications 
that the price of coffee, especially in I 8 6 O - I 8 9 O , may have been 
the prime m o v e r . A c c o r d i n g to Delfim Netto (1973), the 
cyclical movements of coffee prices in the period can be largely 
attributed to physical characteristics of the coffee supply, such 
as the lagged response to price rises (due to the fact that a 
coffee tree takes four to five years to attain full production), 
and the periodic occurrence of sharp drops in yields, for 
climatic reasons. Thus, the price increases in the early 
sixties, early seventies and late eighties were associated with 
Figure 1 - Exchange rate (mil-reis/£) and export 
price of Brazilian coffee (£/bag)1860-1913. 
(three-year moving averages) 
Index (1870=100) 
crop reductions, while the opposite movements, in the intervening 
periods, seem to have been influenced by the delayed effect of 
those increases on the expansion of supply [Delfim Netto (1973, 
pp.37ff.)]. Variations in the stock of money and in coffee prices 
explain statistically most of the oscillations in the exchange 
rate, from 1860 to the early twentieth century.^ 
It appears, thus, that more often it was the coffee market 
that imparted its cyclical movements to the exchange market.12 
It is probable, furthermore, that external capital flows would 
reinforce that tendency. Coffee prices were generally viewed as 
an index of the state and prospects of the economy, so that a 
rise in prices would function as an inducement to foreign in-
vestment. According to Wileman ( I 8 9 6 , p.68), the largest capital 
inflows to the private sector took place in periods of higher 
external value of the mil-reis, 'contrary to what would be 
generally anticipated'. Foreign investors would have been more 
attracted by favourable expectations than deterred by the lower 
mil-reis equivalent of their money, in those periods. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that the exchange rate cycles 
would add to the instability of the import trade. Uncertainty 
as to the conditions and prospects of their businesses could, in 
principle, be seen as an inducement for merchants to diversify 
their capital investments. Furthermore, the periodic variations 
of the exchange rate would favour import substitution, via 
changes in relative prices. Three points may be stressed [v. 
Versiani and Versiani (1975)]: 
(a) In periods of exchange devaluation, the increase in import 
prices would have a protective effect on the internal production 
of importables. 
(b) To the extent that devaluation was accompanied by a fall in 
imports, and in import duty proceeds, the stage would be set for 
an increase in tariff rates, as tariffs were the main source of 
governmental revenue. This would bring about additional 
protection. 
(c) A subsequent increase in the external value of the mil-reis 
could, on the other hand, create conditions favourable to actual 
investment undertakings, to the extent that imported equipment 
was made cheaperQ This would be especially the case if tariff 
increases introduced in the 'devaluation1 phase were not reversed. 
It will be seen that the characteristics of the four periods 
of increased investment activity seem to support the above 
argument. 
V - THE FOUR INVESTMENT SPURTS 
1870-75 - In the late 1860s various tariff reforms were 
introduced, as part of the effort by the Government to increase 
its revenue, in view of the financial burden of the Paraguayan 
War (1864-1870). In 1 8 6 7 , 15% of the tariff dues were made 
payable in gold; in 1869, a new tariff schedule brought about 
further increases; and, in the same year, a general 40% surtax 
on tariff payments was introduced, replacing the gold quota.13 
In the case of textiles, additional protection was given through 
the adoption, in the 1 8 6 9 tariff reform, of weights, instead of 
linear measures, as the basis of taxation. Intentionally or not, 
coarser types of cloth, widely used to clothe slaves, for 
instance, were heavily taxed [BCR (1872, pp.278-81)3. Increased 
tariffs and the devalued mil-reis, coupled with the stimulating 
effect of large budget deficits, brought about a demand boost 
for the few existing producers of manufactures [v. Luz (1961, 
pp.34-35)]. 
In the early seventies, in spite of the end of the war, the 
Government resisted pressures towards a decrease in the tariff 
rates, on grounds that the payment of war debts still weighed 
heavily on the budget [BCR (1872, pp.276-77)]• Even though some 
cuts in the tariff surtax were made, the average tariff rate 
actually showed a marked increase in the period. ^ This tended 
to offset the effect of the increase in the external value of the 
mil-reis. On the other hand, machinery imports (on which tariffs 
were not levied) could take full advantage of the rise in the 
exchange rate. 
1880-84 ~ The latter part of the seventies brought some 
setbacks to the newly established industries. The falling 
trend in textile prices abroad was not offset by exchange rate 
movements, so that internal prices of imported cottons fell 
(see the next section). Some mills registered losses in the 
period; pressed by debts, the largest Rio mill asked for 
government help (which was denied) [Luz (1961, pp.38-39); 
Mascarenhas (1972, p.253)]. At the same time, the financial 
needs of the government, increased by the disastrous drought of 
1877~79, not only made impractible the elimination of the 
temporary1 tariff surtax inherited from the war period, but, on 
the contrary, prompted successive increases in its level, reach-
ing 60% in 1882. Following the same trend, a new tariff reform 
occurred in 1879, with an avowedly protectionist bent [Luz (1961, 
P. 49)]. 
Towards the beginning of the eighties, the rise in the price 
of foreign exchange, and the effect of the tariff increases, 
brought further prosperity to the i n d u s t r y O n the other 
hand, it is probable that, in spite of the adverse exchange rate 
position, the internal prices of imported equipment did not 
increase, in relation to the 1870s, due to the decrease in 
prices in the industrialised countries.16 In this sense, 
investment was not penalised by the relatively high price of 
sterling in the period. 
1889-95 - This period witnessed a drastic increase in the 
stock of money, accompanied by an equally dramatic rise in the 
price of foreign exchange (Figure 1). In addition, tariff dues 
had jumped upwards in the late 1880s. For internal 
producers this was a time of unprecedented boom. One way of 
following the performance of the industry in this period, as 
Clark (1910) observed, is to look at the dividends distributed by 
smaller mills, as the larger ones were generally more conservative 
in their dividend policy. Taking this yardstick, the prosperity 
of the sector, especially in 1892-94, cannot be doubted. The 
record of munificence in a single year seems to have belonged to 
a mill in Caxias,Maranhao, which paid a 76% dividend in 1892; 
but perhaps happier were the shareholders of an Alagoas mill, who 
received 49% in 1892f 50% in 1893, and 47% in 1894. Other 
instances of exceptionally high dividends in these years were also 
registered in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul [Clark (1910, 
pp.44-45); BCR (1895-B, p.9); Wileman ( 1 8 9 6 , p.218); 
Mascarenhas (1972, p.254)]. 
The precipitous devaluation was, of course, in large part a 
consequence of the monetary expansion. The full impact of the 
latter on the exchange market seems, however, to have been felt 
only after a time lag, as Fishlow (1972) has observed. This was 
especially true in I 8 9 O : while the money supply doubled, the 
price of sterling increased only 17% over the previous year [v. 
Pelaez and Suzigan (1976, Tab.A-3, Ml data); IBGE (1939/40, 
p.1358)]. As a consequence, conditions were particularly 
favourable for investment in the early nineties: demand was 
booming, credit was easy, and machinery imports were still 
relatively cheap.-1-" 
1907~1913 ~ This period was also preceded by years of good 
results by existing mills, which followed a general setback in 
the late nineties [v. Clark (1910, p.45)5 also BCR (1897-A); 
BCR (1897-B); BCR (l899~D)]. Exchange devaluation was not, 
this time, important as a protective device: the prosperous 
years of the industry, after 1-900,, in fact coincided with a rise 
in the external value of the mil-r6is. However, as the next 
section shows, this was largely offset by the increase in tariffs 
after the turn of the century. As cotton textile imports into 
Brazil did not vary materially from 1900 to 1913, the increase in 
internal production in the period was not so much a process of 
import substitution, as of import 'pre-emption1; the underlying 
growth of domestic demand was certainly related to the contem-
poraneous boom in coffee revenues, as pointed out by Fishlow 
(1972). 
On the other hand, machinery imports were certainly 
favoured by the falling trend in the price of foreign exchange 
(Figure 1). 
It seems, thus, that the four investment spurts were 
associated with increased protection and with favourable con-
ditions for machinery imports - resulting both from exchange 
rate movements and from the tariff policy. As pointed out 
above, the early 1890s stand out as a period in which the con-
junction of those elements was especially propitious, paving the 
way for a rapid expansion of production. 
VI - SOURCES OF FINANCE 
As mentioned above, the available evidence indicates that 
funds accumulated in the textile import trade were a major source 
of capital for the establishment of the early mills. It is also 
known that banks, and specifically foreign banks doing business 
in the Brazilian external trade, in various cases took an active 
part in the financing of those mills [Stein (1957, chs. 3,6); 
Dean (1969, ch.4)]. 
Apart from the episode of the 1870s, when an abrupt fall in 
cotton export prices impelled landowners to try their hand at 
textile production, there is no evidence that the agrarian 
export sector was an important direct source of capital for the 
new activity, although this is an area in which more research is 
obviously necessary. Dean's study of Sao Paulo industriali-
sation has shown that, while coffee planters were much involved 
in non-agricultural ventures, in the period we are concerned with 
(in part because of the sudden falls in coffee prices), they 
usually confined themselves to activities more directly related 
to the coffee business, such as the building of railways to the 
coffee frontier [Dean ( 1 9 6 9 , chs. 3.4)]. In relation to other 
possible areas of investment, consumer goods manufacturing would 
probably appear to planters as too risky. 
Capital could of course come from the export sector through 
the intermediation of banks or the incipient stock-market. For 
instance, one large Sao Paulo mill was owned by a bank founded by 
coffee planters [Cano (1975, pp.185,188)]; and it is probable 
that, during the speculative fever of the early nineties, a 
certain volume of small savings flowed into firms then being 
formed, or increasing their c a p i t a l B u t fear of loss of 
control on the part of the original founders would be an 
obstacle to any significant expansion of ownership; to the 
extent that the typical textile firm was controlled primarily 
by merchant interests, it is doubtful that much scope would be 
left for outside financing other than short-term credits. 
Profit reinvestment, on the other hand, seems to have 
played an important part in the growth of the industry. In the 
1890s, the rapid expansion in productive capacity was largely 
the result of the growth of existing concerns. In the Rio area 
(where industry was mainly concentrated, at the time), it can be 
estimated that expansion of pre-1889 mills accounted for one 
half of the total increase in capacity, from 1885 to 1899.20 
Data on the evolution of the capital stock of the major Rio mills 
shows that such expansion was financed mostly by profit reinvest-
ment [Versiani and Versiani (1975)]. 
An association between size of firm and the propensity to 
reinvest was noted by Clark (1910, pp.42-43)]; his data on the 
largest Rio mills show that close to 60% of their capital stock 
in 1910 corresponded to accretions made in 1891-95, mostly 
through profit reinvestment. Evidence pointing in the same 
direction comes from a comparison of the ratios of reserves to 
capital for the mills whose shares were traded on the Rio stock 
exchange: for the seven largest mills, reserves averaged 62% 
of capital in mid-1905 (that is, after a period of good results), 
suggesting a tendency to plough back profits: for the remaining 
fourteen companies, that ratio was only 10%. The picture that 
emerges is that of an industry growing largely through the 
expansion of old-established firms, financed by profit reinvest-
ment. 
We can only speculate on the characteristics of the growing, 
profit-reinvesting firms, as opposed to the stagnating ones. 
But a glimpse of the 'Faustian conflict between the passion for 
accumulation, and the desire for enjoyment1, to use Marx's 
expression, is given by the evolution of the dividend policy of 
Cedro e Cachoeira, a family-owned Minas Gerais mill. From 1887 
to 1894, this firm enjoyed handsome profits, averaging 25% per 
year as a percentage of capital, and paid dividends at the annual 
rate of 22% on capital. In the crisis of the late nineties, the 
firm was faced with serious cash-flow problems, but this was not 
thought to justify a change in its policies: shareholders were still 
paid high dividends, which, however, they had to collect in kind 
(in pieces of cloth), or else in the form of IOUs, on which the 
firm would dutifully pay a 5% annual interest. Clearly, the mill 
owners, a family of prosperous merchants and planters, viewed 
their industrial enterprise more as rentiers than as capitalists. 
Following repeated clashes in the board of directors, where a 
minority favoured the establishment of a dividend ceiling and 
larger reserves for re-equipment, a maximum dividend of 12% was 
finally adopted in 1900. By then, the firm had largely lost the 
chance to expand, or modernise, with its own funds: the average 
profit rate, up to 1913, was only % [Mascarenhas (1972)]. This 
example also illustrates well the importance of the boom of the 
early nineties for the industry: a time of high profits, and a 
signal for growth opportunities. This was grasped by firms such 
as the Fiagfio e Tecidos, of Pernambuco: sticking to a 10% 
annual dividend, it was able to finance an almost fourfold in-
crease in its productive capacity, in 1890-94, entirely by profit 
reinvestment [BCR (1895-B)J. 
VII - THE PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF TARIFFS 
The idea that tariffs may have provided incentive for in-
dustrial investment poses some questions. The tariff system 
was, at that time, basically designed to furnish revenue rather 
than protection; indeed, free-trade policies should be expected 
to prevail in a society in which the interests of the landowner-
exporter elite were clearly preponderant. The successive tariff 
reforms up to 1900 show that high duties were viewed largely as 
a necessary evil: rate increases, adopted as a rule under the 
pressure of financial crises, were always followed by a reaction 
towards liberalisation [Luz ( I 9 6 I ) ] . Those facts have led to 
the widely accepted view that the protective effect of tariffs 
was unimportant in the period [for instance, Fishlow (1972)]. 
Not much is known, in point of fact, about the extent of the 
increase in the price of imports brought about by tariff payments: 
it is not easy to ascertain the level of tariff rates, at a 
particular point in time. Duties were levied on the basis of 
percentages applied to an official price list of importable goods 
(which could only be changed by Act of Parliament). Even 
assuming that such lists correctly reflected market prices when 
they were prepared (a doubtful assumption, as a new set of prices 
was sometimes arrived at by a simple proportional increase, 
applied across the board to the existing list), it is clear that 
price changes occurring between tariff reforms could materially 
alter the relative burden of tariffs. Now the evolution of 
import prices is itself difficult to follow, as Brazilian trade 
statistics for the period before 1901 only indicate the 
'official' value of imports (that is, the value arrived at by 
using the official price list). 
The index of implicit tariff rates on cotton textiles, 
presented below (Table 5), is an attempt to throw some light on 
the question of the price mark-ups resulting from the tariff. 
The index is based on tariffs levied on types of cotton cloth 
which can be taken as representative of domestic Brazilian 
production at the time. As an indicator of import prices, the 
price index of cotton textile exports from the United Kingdom 
is used. The method of construction and the sources of data 
are discussed in Appendix B. 
Table 5; Brazil: effect of tariffs on cotton textile 
import prices, 1870-1913 
(1870 = 100, period averages) 








( A ) X ( B ) 
1 8 7 0 - 1 8 7 5 86 103 89 
1 8 7 6 - 1 8 7 9 77 110 84 
1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 4 78 113 88 
1 8 8 5 - 1 8 8 8 69 12k 85 
1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 5 100 132 130 
1 8 9 6 - 1 9 0 0 163 126 204 
1 9 0 1 - 1 9 0 6 115 162 186 
1907-1913 113 168 189 
Sources and method: (A) Average price of cotton piece 
goods exported from the United Kingdom,, from Mitchell and 
Jones (19719 p.195), converted into mil-reis at exchange 
rates given in IBGE (1939/40, p.1353); (B) See Appendix B. 
As seen in Table 5, the resulting index (column B) presents 
a few surprises, in view of the received wisdom on this point. 
In the first place, a consistent rising trend is found (with 
the exception of the late 1890s ): in spite of frequent tariff 
changes, a tendency towards an ever higher protective barrier is 
apparent. It is significant that, in the base year of 1870, 
nominal rates, which in this case were probably close to 
actual rates, already reached almost 50% (Appendix B). Second, 
it is clear that, tariffs were an important element in the upward 
trend of mil-reis prices of textile imports. This is suggested 
by a comparison of the indices in column A (a price index for 
British exports of cottons, in mil-reis), and in column C; the 
former can be taken as an index of internal prices of imported 
textiles, in the absence of tariffs, while the latter points to 
the evolution of prices paid by importers, including tariff dues. 
Both in the 1880s and after the turn of the century, declines in 
import prices (column A) were largely offset by increases in 
tariff rates. What happened in the second of those periods is 
especially remarkable when we consider the abrupt fall in pre-
tariff import prices from. 1896-19OO to 19OI-19O6 (caused by the 
appreciation of the mil-reis in the period). In the absence of 
the compensating influence of tariffs, domestic producers would 
probably have suffered a heavy blow from the competition of cheap 
imports. 
The above findings suggest that a combination of tariff in— 
creases and exchange devaluations provided a definite and con-
sistent pattern of protection for domestic mills from 1870 on. 
Increases in the price of foreign exchange, in the 1890s, early 
1880s, and late 1860s, were followed by higher levels of 
tariff protection, cushioning internal producers from the effect 
of subsequent appreciations of the mil-reis. Thus, while 
exchange devaluations had important short-run protective effects, 
enduring protection was mainly secured by the tariff system. 
Tariff policy and tariff politics 
If the above argument is correct, why did the repeated 
efforts in favour of trade liberalisation fail to halt the trend 
towards increased protection? One reason, no doubt, was the 
very fall in import prices in the 1870s and 1880s (resulting 
from the decrease in British prices in the depression of that 
period), and again in the first decade of the present century-
following the appreciation of the mil-reis). It may be as-
sumed that resistance against tariffs would stem mostly from 
their effect on the final price of imports; the implicit level 
of protection should not be a matter of general concern. In a 
situation of falling external prices, it would be comparatively 
easy, in political terms, to maintain a certain absolute level of 
tariff payments - or even to raise it. And, of course, merely 
keeping tariffs constant, when import prices were falling, meant 
an increase in the relative level of protection. 
On the other hand, the financial authorities, hard pressed 
by a chronic budgetary deficit, could be expected to welcome any 
opportunity to increase governmental revenues.22 On this, 
however, the limits given by political feasibility were rather 
narrow. Utilisation of some of the more obvious sources of 
revenue was effectively precluded by the influence of large land-
owners on governmental decisions: a limited tax on land, for 
instance, many times considered as a possibility, was never 
adopted, ostensibly on grounds that it would be too difficult to 
assess and administer [BCR (1885, pp.399-400); Normano (1935, 
ch.5)]. Taxes on exports were mild and ceased to provide 
revenue for the central government when, after the republican 
constitution of 1891, the right to tax exports was reserved to 
the states. Import tariffs remained, thus, by far the main 
source of revenue for the government, up to the First World War; 
the participation of Gustoms receipts in total revenue fluctuated 
around 60% from 1860 to 1914.2* 
Tariffs on cotton textiles made up an -important proportion 
of Customs revenues [close to 30%, in 1878-82: v. BCR (1885)]. 
It is arguable that the characteristics of the demand for 
imported cottons made this item especially suitable to provide 
revenue increases, in the short run (or, at least, that un-
sophisticated tax collectors found reason to believe so). An 
early investigation of the effects of the 1844 tariff had found, 
for instance, that a doubling of tariff rates on cotton goods 
had been followed by a decrease in imports by 10%, at the same 
time as tariff proceeds from this source had increased by one 
third [CommissSto ... (1853-A)]. A similarly positive reaction 
of tariff receipts followed the increase in rates under the 
1879 tariff reform, generally -supposed to have had a protective 
effect [cf. BCR (1885, pp.365-66)]. The idea that, as to 
tariff policy, 'the fiscal and industrial interests were in 
accord' [Normano (1935, p.141)], although somewhat simplistic as 
a generalisation, may have been largely true in the case of 
textiles. 
If adoption of protective tariffs was made easier by falling 
import prices and governmental revenue needs, this course also 
was actively sought by the industrialists themselves. The 
pressure of their demands, with the backing of nationalistic 
voices in Parliament and in the press, was felt with increasing 
force in the last decades of the nineteenth century [Luz (1961, 
esp. chs. 3,4)]. Various pieces of legislation with an openly 
protectionist intent appeared in the 1880s. In the Budget Law 
of 1888, for instance, the government was authorised to intro-
duce a tariff surtax to compensate domestic manufacturers for the 
appreciation of the mil-reis, and, specifically, to increase 
duties on cotton and jute goods, 'so that products from national 
factories are not penalised by competition'.24 In 1887 the non-
existence of a locally produced 'similar' was made a condition 
of tariff exemptions - an early version of the Lei dos Similares, 
which would play sugh an important role in later stages of 
industrialisation.25 Also indicative of the weight of manu-
facturing interests is the fact that cotton mills, ironworks, and 
shipyards were, with no apparent justification other than pro-
tection, made exempt from the new tax on industries and profes-
sions, shortly after its introduction, in 1 8 6 9 , 
It is interesting that even at the level of the provinces, 
where the influence of agricultural interests could be expected 
to be relatively larger, an alliance between the fiscal needs of 
local administrations and the demands of industrialists for pro-
tection was frequently operative. This is clear, for instance, 
in the case of the additional export tax on goods shipped from 
Bahia in bagging not produced in that province, established as 
early as 1849. The tax was apparently an important protective 
element for the early Bahia textile industry; when it was later 
abolished, mill owners petitioned successfully for its re-
instatement [Stein (1957, p.21); Sampaio (1975, pp.55ff.)]. 
Provincial import tariffs (which, although repeatedly declared to 
be unconstitutional by the Imperial government, generally re-
appeared under different guises) were also reported to be used to 
protect local enterprises [Sampaio (1975, PP.55-56); BCR (1884, 
p.1603)]. 
The bargaining position of industrialists seems to have 
improved after 1889, under the new republican regime. In the 
first years, at least, the government in fact viewed the 
strengthening of the industrial sector as a guarantee of the new 
order: 'the development of industry is, for the Nation, not only 
an economic issue, but above all a political one1 - wrote the 
Finance Minister Ruy Barbosa in the preamble of the Decree 
establishing a new tariff in 1890 (Dec. 836, of 11/10/90). The 
influence of industry on policy making in fact increased [Luz 
(1961)]; it is significant, for instance, that rises in the gold 
quota, the main instrument of tariff increases after 1900, were 
often preceded by strong campaigns in their support, on the part 
of cotton manufacturers [ibid.]. 
The internal price level: an overvalued mil-r6is? 
A flaw in the analysis above is that the behaviour of prices 
other than those of imported textiles was not considered; the 
competitiveness of domestic production could also have been af-
fected by changes in the internal price level. Direct evidence 
on Brazilian prices in the nineteenth century is, however, very 
scarce. One of the few indices available for an extended period 
of time is that compiled by Lobo and others (1971) for the 
price of some food staples in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Even 
though its coverage is very limited, the index may be useful in 
illustrating long-term trends. 
The Lobo index indicates a rising trend in food prices in 
the second half of the nineteenth century (Table 6, column A). 
It can be assumed that this would be reflected in increased 
labour costs for mill owners; Stein (1957, ch. 7) in fact 
mentions a tightening of the labour market in the period. Thus, 
although the incipient manufacturing sector had a labour supply 
which was, within limits, probably elastic, as pointed out above, 
it had to contend with the increasing cost of reproduction of the 
labour force. 
Columns B and C of Table 6 show the results of deflating the 
series of mil-reis prices of imported cottons, from Table 5, by 
means of the Lobo index. To the extent that wages were the major 
differential production cost of domestic mills in relation to 
producers abroad, the numbers in those columns may be seen as a 
rough indicator of the price of imported textiles expressed in 
terms of local costs of production. 2 7 If this is granted, the 
trend revealed in column B implies a steady and sharp decrease in 
the competitiveness of local production, vis-i-vis imports, 
Table 6: Estimates o.f real, prices of Brazilian cotton textile 
imports, 1850-1913 
(1870-74 = 100, period averages) 
Sources and method: (A) Rio food prices from Lobo (1971* 
Table 1, series with 1919 weights); (B) Import price index as 
in Table 5, column A, deflated by the Rio price index in (A); 
(C) Import price index as in Table 5, column C, deflated in the 
same way. 
through the whole period 1860-1913 - in the absence of tariffs. 
On the other hand, the index of column C, which takes into 
account the effect of tariffs, indicates a reversal of this trend, 
from 1885~94 on, with imports becoming more expensive in terms of 
domestic costs. These results emphasise again the crucial role 
played by tariff protection, at the same time as tfrey suggest an 
additional explanation for the rapid expansion of the industry, 
after the mid-eighties. 
The striking falling trend in the index of column B (Table 6) 
is, if it can be taken at face value, a very interesting 
phenomenon. There are indications that the downward trend would 
persist, even if more broadly based indicators of internal and 
external price levels were u s e d . 2 8 j n other words, there would 
have been a long-run trend towards an over-valuation of the mil"* 
reis, in the nineteenth century, in terms of the purchasing-
power-parity standard. This point cannot be pursued here; but 
it may open new possibilities of interpretation of some aspects 












1850-1859 49 169 
1860-1869 72 177 
1870-1874 100 100 100 
1875-1884 114 77 83 
1885-1894 137 71 89 
1895-1904 244 67 90 
1905-1913 222 56 92 
VIII - CONCLUSION 
Two major types of question arise, dn relation to the 
industrialisation of peripheral, export-oriented economies: 
those related to the impulses of the process, and those refer-
ring to the origins of capital and labour for the new sector. 
As Hirschman (1968) points out, the impulse to import-
substitution industrialisation is usually explained in terms of 
one of three causal forces: wars and balance-of-payments 
difficulties, gradual growth of income through export expansion, 
or deliberate development policies. The evolution of Brazilian 
cotton manufacture before 1914, reviewed above, suggests that 
while export-led income growth provided an expanding market for 
the new activity, especially after the turn of the century, the 
stimulus for development of domestic production originated from 
two factors: (i) The protective effect of the tariff system. 
The evidence examined above suggests that, in the absence of the 
tariff barrier gradually erected in the second half of the last 
century, industrial investment could hardly have proved profit-
able, in the period. (ii) Imbalances in the external sector, 
in the form of frequent, and sometimes drastic, oscillations in 
the exchange rate. Those imbalances were, it is argued, largely 
related to the behaviour of coffee prices and to shifts in the 
monetary supply. 
Tariff protection did not come about, at the time, as part 
of a 'deliberate development policy', but was largely the result 
of public finance practices then prevailing; an important 
element- of those practices was, no doubt, the resistance of the 
export-landowning elite to other, more direct forms of taxation. 
But it would be a mistake to consider protection as a mere by-
product of a fiscally oriented tariff system: the fact that 
the protective effect of tariffs increased consistently, at least 
after 1870, suggests that this may also have been an intentional 
objective of policy. The very emergence of an industrial 
nucleus would bring into play new social forces, and new vested 
interests, intent on the preservation and expansion of the new 
activity. The tariff policy could not fail to be influenced by 
these changes. 
As to labour supply, it appears that women and children 
provided an ample reservoir of cheap unskilled labour to be 
tapped by the textile mills, both in urban and rural areas. On 
the sources of capital and entrepreneurship, the available evi-
dence strongly suggests that the role of cloth merchants was 
preponderant. Profit reinvestment was another important source 
of funds. The idea that the coffee sector may have been a basic 
direct supplier of capital to industry does not find support in 
the data examined above. 
These findings point to a considerably more complex pattern 
of relations between the agricultural-export sector and the new 
industrial activities than some current interpretations might 
suggest. The emergence of textile manufacture as a field of in-
vestment can hardly be associated, at least not in a mechanistic 
way, with 'crises' in the traditional export-import structure, as 
extreme versions of the 'adverse shocks' argument would have it 
Ccf. Frank (1969, ch. 3)1. In fact, as indicated above, invest-
ment in internal production tended to coincide with periods of 
good export performance (and relatively high external value of 
the mil-reis). 
On the other hand, a direct association between export booms 
(as in the 1890s) and the growth of industrial capital seems no 
more convincing, nor warranted. We have seen that the develop-
ment of manufacturing productive capacity was a more gradual 
process than is commonly realised: domestic supply could respond 
as it did to increased demand in the 1890s, largely because of 
the previous growth of the industry. No doubt the behaviour of 
coffee prices can be said to have indirectly favoured that growth 
(as argued above); but this was only true because the tariff -
system effectively shielded local producers from the worst con-
sequences of the periodic appreciations of the mil-r6is. In 
this sense, industrialisation in the period was not a 
'spontaneous' process; it would be clearly inadequate to think 
of it in terms of the standard 'staple' models of trade and 
growth.50 
The above findings suggest certain similarities between the 
period examined and the post-1914 industrialisation process. 
Recurring phases of increased production, for example, occurred 
in both periods (cf. Table 1); and the importance of profits 
generated by these demand expansions in financing subsequent 
increases in productive capacity, before 1914, recalls similar 
arguments in relation to the boom in production during World War I 
[Fishlow (1972)], and in the 1930s [Furtado (1959, ch. 32)]. 
The role of tariff protection, before 1914, also underlines an 
analogy with later developments [cf. Bergsman ( 1 9 7 1 ) ] . Upsurges 
in internal demand, and favourable (if not always intentional) 
governmental policies, seem to have been basic elements in the 
initial growth of industrial capital in Brazil. 

APPENDIX A - Dates of foundation of cotton mills in existence 
in 1905 
c) Founded in 1 8 7 6 - 1 8 7 9 - Pau Grande (RJ): 1 8 7 8 ; Sao Roque 
(SP)1 1 8 7 9 . 
d) Founded in 1880-1884 - Alianga (RJ): 1880; Sabarense (MG): 
1880; Nossa Senhora da Ponte, Sorocaba (SP): l88l; Cagu, 
Uberaba (MG): 1882; Sao Sebastiao, Curvelo (MG): 1882; 
Mineira (MG): 1883; Confianga (RJ): 1884; Anhaia (SP): 1884; 
Fabril (RS): 1884; Aracaju (SE): 1884; Industrial Caxiense 
(MA): 1884. 
e) Founded before 1884 (year not ascertained) - Montes Claros 
(MG); Bom Jardim, Araguai (MG); Tatui (SP); Machado (MG). 
f) Founded in I 8 8 5 - I 8 8 8 - Sao Silvestre, Vigosa (MG): 1885; 
Carioca (RJ): 1886; Cachoeira dos Macacos (MG): 1886; 
Bernardo Mascarenhas (MG): 1887; Fiagao e Tecelagem Maranhense 
(MA): 1887; Cachoeira (AL): 1888; Pedreira, Itabira (MG): 
1888; Mascarenhas, Alvinopolis (MG): 1888; Sao Roberto, 
Gouveia (MG): 1888. 
g) Founded in 1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 5 - Corcovado (RJ): 1889; Progresso 
Industrial (RJ): 1889; Andorinhas (RJ): I 8 9 O ; Camaragibe 
(PE): 1890-94; Paulista (EE): 1890-94; Industrial Goiana 
(PE): 1890-94; Sanharo (MA): 1890-94; Codo (MA): 1890-94; 
Uniao Caxiense (MA): 1890-94; Rio Anil (MA): 1890-95; 
Industrial Maranhense (MA): 1890-95; Emporio Industrial (BA): 
1 8 9 1 ; Sao-joanense (MG): 1891; Santanense, Itauna (MG): 1891; 
Mageense (RJ): 1891; Votorantim (SP): 1892; D. Isabel (RJ): 
not later than 1892; Sao Joaquira, Niteroi (RJ): 1893; Fabril 
Maranhense (MA): 1893; Manufatora Fluminense (RJ): n.l.t. 
1893; Sao Bernardo (SP): n.l.t. 1895; Sao Joao Nepomuceno (MG): 
n.l.t. 1895. 
a) Founded before 1870 - Santo Antonio do Queimado (BA): 1834; 
Conceigao (BA): 1835; Sao Pedro de Alcantara (RJ): l840s; 
Todos os Santos (BA): 1845; Santo Aleixo(RJ): 1849; Sao 
Carlos de Paraguagu (BA): 1857; Uniao Mercantil (AL): 1857; 
Modelo (BA): 1 8 5 8 ; Nossa Senhora do Amparo (BA): 1862; Sao 
Luis de Itu (SP): 1 8 6 9 . 
b) Founded in 1870-1875 - Cedro (MG): I 8 7 O ; Sao Salvador (BA): 
1870; Brasil Industrial (RJ): 1871; Bonfim (BA): 1872; 
Brumado,Pitangui (MG): 1872; Cachoeira (MG): 1873; Nossa 
Senhora da Penha (BA): 1873; Petropolitana (RJ): 1873; 
Magdalena (EE): 1874; Major Barros (SP): 1874; Uniao Itabirana 
(MG): 1875; Sao Bras (BA): 1875; Carioba (SP): 1875; 
Beriberi (MG): 1875-
h) Founded in 1896-1905 - Itabira do Campo, Itabirito (MG): 
1896 Melancias, Sete Lagoas (MG): n.l.t. 1897; Mooca (SP): 
1897; Mariangela (SP): 1904. 
Notes: (a) The 1905 totals include, in-some instances, new 
mills belonging to the same firm. (b) Abbreviations: AL: 
Alagoas; BA: Bahia; MA: Maranhao; MG: Minas Gerais; PE: 
Pernambuco; RJ: Rio de Janeiro (city and state); SE: 
Sergipe; SP: Sao Paulo; RS: Rio Grande do Sul; n.l.t.: 
not later than. 
Sources: BCR (l877)5 BCR (l88?-B); BCR (1890); BCR (1895-B); 
BCR (1896); BCR (1897-A); BTJ (1888); Branner (1885); 
Canabrava (1951); Clark (1910); Comissao...(1853-B); Cunha 
Vasco (1905); Dean (1969)5 Decree no. 6l62, of 24/3/1876; 
Decree no. 7843, of 31/3/1880; Juiz de Fora...(1901); 
Mascarenhas (1972); Rio News: RMF (1899); RMI (1896); 
Sampaio (1975); Stein (1957); Vaz (1977); Wileman (1896). 
APPENDIX B - Construction of an index of implicit tariff rates 
on cotton textiles 
The objective is to obtain an index of the addition to 
import prices brought about by the imposition of tariffs; that 
is, a series of values (1 + dt) / (1 + do), where d is the 
proportional increase in price due to tariffs, t indicates the 
year of reference, and o the base year. 
We can write: 
where D is the absolute value of the tariff payment, and 
P the price of the imported goods (in mil-reis). 
From (I) and (II), we obtain: 
The index was constructed on the basis of equation (III). 
(D, / D0) is an index of the tariffs levied on the more 
common types of cloth produced in Brazil in the period; the 
index was arrived at by averaging indices for tariffs on the 
more inferior type of grey cloth (weight 2), bleached cloth 
(weight 1), and dyed cloth (weight 1), The period covered is 
1870-1913, with 1870 as the base year; before 1869 tariffs were 
based on a different system of measures, so that no comparison 
is possible. Account was taken of the following surtaxes, in 
force in the period: 
a) surtax of 5% on the official values of imports, in 1870-74 
and the first half of 1875; 
b) surtaxes imposed on the tariff payments themselves: 40% 
(1870, 2nd half of 1874, and 1875); 34% (1871); 28% (1872-73, 
and 1st half of 1874); 45% (1876-77); 50% (1878-82); 60% 
(1883-86, 1st half of 1887, and in 1892-95); and a sliding 
surtax of up to 20%, according to the exchange rate (l889~90); 
c) additional 5% surtax on the basic tariff (Fund for the 
Emancipation of Slaves), from mid~l887 to I89O; 
d) gold quota: up to 20% in I89O; 100% from 15/11/1890 to the 
end of 1891; 10% in 1899; 15% in 1900, 25% in 1901-05, and 50% 
in 1906-13. 
(Py / Po) is the index of prices of cotton piece goods ex-
ported from the United Kingdom, converted to mil-reis. 
dQ was taken to be 0.47, which is the nominal tariff rate 
on the above mentioned types of cloth, in the base year (1870). 
As the 1869 tariff schedule was based on a carefully revised 
official price list [TRF (1869)], it is probable that the actual 
price mark-up caused by the tariff was close to that fraction 
in 1870. Compare also BCR (1874, p.41). 
Sources: Tariffs from TRF (various issues). For the surtaxes, 
see, in addition to the Budget Laws of the period, and the 
Decrees introducing each new tariff, the following Decrees: 
1750, of 20/10/1869; 4601, of 24/9/1870; 2035, of 23/9/1871; 
5580, of 31/3/1874; 6053, of 13/12A875; 6829, of 26/1/1879; 
9593, of 7/5A886; 10170, of 26/1/1889; 391-C, of 10/5/1890; 
804, of 4A0/1890. 
For (Pt / PQ), see Table 5. 
The following table shows the indices Dt / Do, Pt / Po and 
(1 + dt) / (1 + do), for 1870-1913. 
Table A-l: Brazil; indices of the absolute value- of tariffs,, 
import, prices, and implicit tariff rates, for cotton 
textiles, 1870-1913 ' 
(1870 = 100) 
Abs. tariff Import Implicit 
values (Dt/Do) prices (Pt/Po) tariff rates 
(l+dt) / (l+dQ) 
1870 100 100 100 
1871 96 88 103 
1872 92 90 101 
1873 92 84 103 
1874 93 80 105 
1875 93 75 108 
1876 97 73 111 
1877 97 76 109 
1878 100 78 109 
1879 100 79 109 
1880 107 79 111 
1881 10? 77 113 
1882 107 81 110 
1883 114 77 115 
1884 114 77 115 
1885 114 81 113 
1886 114 76 116 
1887 120 64 128 
1888 126 56 140 
1889 143 53 154 
1890 137 64 137 
I891 187 98 129 
1892 222 114 130 
1893 222 120 127 
1894 222 127 124 
1895 222 127 124 1896 275 156 124 
1897 275 169 120 
1898 259 172 116 
1899 327 169 130 
1900 331 149 139 
1901 348 126 156 
1902 341 118 160 
1903 340 121 158 
1904 338 129 152 
1905 304 97 168 
1906 346 101 178 
1907 360 115 168 
1908 361 114 169 
1909 361 107 176 
1910 345 110 168 
1911 347 115 165 
1912 347 112 167 
1913 347 117 163 
NOTES 
1. The following abbreviations will be used for quotations in 
the text: AST - Annual Statement of Trade of the United 
Kingdom; BCR - British Consular Reports; BTJ - Board of 
Trade Journal; CIB - Centro Industrial do Brasil; DGE -
Directoria Geral de Estatistica; IBGE - Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatistica; RMF - Ministerio da Fazenda, 
Relatorio; RMI - Ministerio da Industria, ViagSo e Obras 
Publicas, Relatorio; TRF - Tarifa das Alf£ndegas. Complete 
references will be found at the end of the paper. 
2. References to the literature on Brazilian industrialisation 
can be found in Versiani and Mendonga (1977). 
3. DGE (1927, pp.22-23). Of the ten largest mills, in 1919, 
five had been established before 1888; see Pearse (1923). 
4. From 1905 to 1915 the number of mills roughly doubled (111 
to 240), and so did the stock of spindles and looms [Garry 
(1920)]. 
5. In 1888, of the 125 cloth wholesalers inscribed in the list 
of payers of the Industry and Professions Tax, 112 were 
immigrants, 60 of them being Portuguese [RMF (1888, p.58)]. 
On the importance of Italian immigrants in SSto Paulo trade, 
see Dean (1969, ch. iv). 
6. Data on British exports from AST (various issues). The 
average production of a British cotton mill in the 1850s 
can be estimated at about million yards per year, from 
data on production per loom (in l859~6l) and average number 
of looms in integrated mills (in 1850) given by Ellison 
(1886, pp. 69-72). Conversion of pounds into yards was 
made by means of the ratio 7.5 yd./lb. [cf. Fishlow 
(1972, Table 1)]. 
7. In answer to a questionnaire presented by local authorities, 
the owners of a textile mill located in a rural area of 
Minas Gerais stated, in 1882, that there had been no dif-
ficulty in obtaining workers for the mill, although they 
found the labour force lacking in 'industrial education1. 
Of the firm's 264 workers in 1884, 111 were women and 101 
were boys and girls under eighteen; the foremen came mostly 
from England [Mascarenhas (1972, pp.89, 128-29)]. 
8. Data on extreme yearly exchange rates from BCR (1899~E, 
P.34). 
9 . The increase in the 1860s was related to monetary emissions 
to help finance the Paraguayan War; the money supply (M1) 
more than doubled from 1864 to 18?0. In 1890-91, following 
a liberal banking reform, the monetary stock increased 
threefold. In between, a very restrictive monetary policy 
was followed: in per capita terms, the stock of money 
actually fell by 20% from 1869 to 1 8 8 9 . See data in 
Pelaez and Suzigan (1976, Tab. A-3). IBGE (1939/40, p.1293). 
10. To the extent that changes in coffee prices were accompanied 
by variations in export proceeds in the same direction, a 
decrease in price would be associated with a smaller supply 
of foreign exchange, and pressure towards devaluation; con-
versely, a devaluation brought about, say, by an increased 
demand for imports at home, could be expected to bring down 
the world price of coffee, given the predominant share of 
Brazil in total supply. 
11. A regression linking the average yearly exchange rate, E, to 
the export price of coffee in sterling, C, and the per-
capita stock of money, M, for the period of larger exchange 
rate oscillations (1860-1906), yields a coefficient of 
determination = 0.86. The equation is (standard errors 
in parentheses): 
E = 7.13 - 1.77 C + 0.44 M 
(1.6) (0.46) (0.03) 
The Durbin-Watson statistic (O .64) indicates, not sur-
prisingly, runs above and below the estimates. Data from 
IBGE (1939/40), Pelaez and Suzigan (1976). 
12. Such a relation was taken for granted, contemporaneously, as 
seen in the following quotation from the Board of Trade 
Journal: 
'If the new [coffee] crop, .... which will be in 
bloom about the end of October, and then 
susceptible of estimation, should turn out, as it 
is likely, to be a good one, a considerable de-
crease in the prices seems inevitable. This 
would naturally bring about a decrease in exchange.' 
[BTJ (1902, pp.560-61)]. 
1 3 . Decrees n o s . 1 5 0 7 ( 2 6 / 9 / 1 8 6 7 ) , 4343 ( 2 2 / 3 A 8 6 9 ) , and 1 7 5 0 
( 2 0 / 1 0 / 1 8 6 9 ) . To pay for the gold quota of the duties, im-
porters had to buy gold coins or gold certificates in the 
market, which were., received by the Customs at the official 
par value ( 8 . 8 8 9 mil-reis per £ sterling). If the price of 
sterling was one third above par (as in the late sixties), 
a 15% gold quota would mean a 5% increase in tariff payments. 
14. The average tariff rate (customs revenue divided by the total 
value of imports) increased from 28%, in 1866/67-1869/70, to 
in I87O/7I-I875/76. [RMF (various issues); IBGE 
(1959/40, p.1558)]. 
15. Indirect evidence on this comes from the fall in imports of 
'domestics1; see above. Data on profits of the Mascarenhas 
mills, in Minas Gerais, show a sharp turnabout in 1879, after 
a period of bad results [Mascarenhas (1972, p.254)]. 
16. Although there is no direct evidence on the prices of imported 
equipment, it is significant that the price index of indus-
trial products in England, multiplied by the index of the 
price of sterling in mil-reis, falls from 116, in 1870-74, to 
104, in 1880-84, and to 91, in 1 8 8 5 - 8 9 (l875~79 - 100). 
Basic data from Mitchell (1962, p.472) and IBGE (1939/40, 
pp.1353-54)• Textile equipment was imported mainly from 
England. 
17. Partly in consequence of worries about the increased com-
petition faced by the domestic industry, due to the appre-
ciation of the mil-reis; see below. 
18. The increase in the inflow of immigrants, especially after 
the emancipation of slaves in 1888, was no doubt another 
favourable element, particularly through its effect on the 
availability of skilled labour. 
19. The case of the largest mill founded in the early nineties -
and one of the very few cotton mills whose evolution has been 
studied - is illustrative. Established in 1891, in Bahia, 
the Emporio mill had about 30% of its capital in the hands of 
its founders, three cloth merchants, and of a bank; each of 
the other 1 4 6 shareholders held less than 2% of the stock 
[Sampaio (1972, ch. 2)]. 
20. Of the total increase in the number of looms in the state and 
city of Rio de Janeiro, from 1885 to 1899, 49.5% corresponded 
to expansions in mills established before 1888. Cf. data in 
Branner (1885), BCR (1886), BCR (l895~A), and BCR (1899-C). 
21. Computed from data in Cunha Vasco (1910). 
22. From 1860 to 1913, government expenditures exceeded annual 
receipts by 23%, on the average [v. IBGE (1939/40, p.1410)]. 
23. For data on the composition of the government revenue see RMF 
(various issues). The relative importance of Customs revenue 
tended to decrease up to 1890, but increased again under the 
republican government, reaching a maximum of 75% of the total 
revenue, in 1892-97. 
24. Law no. 3396, of 21/11/1888. An analogous protective 
provision appeared already in the Budget Law of 1886. 
25. Law no. 3348, of 20/10/1887. The 'similar1 clause was later 
made more explicit by Decrees nos.947-A, of 4/11/1890, and 
8592, of. -8/3/1911. On the importance of the Lei dos 
Similares, v. Baer (1965). 
26. V. the Budget Law of 1870 (Law no. 1836, of 27/9/1870). 
The exemption was later incorporated in the decree regulating 
the tax (Decree no. 5690, of 15/7/1874). 
2 7 . Raw material and labour costs made up 70% to 80% of total 
costs. Cotton, being an export crop in Brazil, had its 
price determined in the world market; local mills could not 
count on any significant cost advantage from this source, all 
the more so as the same export taxes were levied by the 
cotton-producing Northeastern states on cotton sold abroad as 
on that shipped to the Southern states. When the external 
value of the mil-reis declined, for instance, local mills had 
to put up with an increase in the prices of Brazilian cotton 
in line with the mil-reis equivalent of quotations on the 
Liverpool exchange LCunha Vasco ( 1 9 1 0 ) , Sampaio ( 1 9 7 2 ) , BCR 
(1899-B); BCR ( 1 9 0 0 ) ] . 
28. The trend is maintained, for instance, if a general price 
index for England [from Mitchell (1962, pp.471-72)] is sub-
stituted for the cotton export prices. On the other hand, 
some additional evidence available for Brazilian prices, a 
crude index for some isolated years given by Onody. (I96O, 
p.25), shows a long-run tendency broadly similar to that of 
the Lobo index. 
2 9 . It may, for instance, help to explain the comparatively late 
start of a process of diversification in the productive 
structure in the nineteenth century [cf. Leff ( 1 9 7 2 ) ] . One 
clue to the tendency of internal prices to rise in the period 
may be the decrease in food crops following the rapid ex-
pansion of coffee plantations, in the second half of the 
century [Martins (1973, pp.65, 1 1 4 ) 3 . 
30. The classical analytical description of a staple-based 
process of growth is that of Caves (I965). 
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